Introduction
The post-crisis reform period in Asia has been characterized by an emphasis on the prudential regulation of banks, concomitant with an increased liberalization of the banking systems. More specifically, while large-scale bank restructuring programmes and tighter prudential rules were put in place in those countries most affected by the 1997 crisis (e.g., Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines), other countries, such as China, India and Vietnam, saw an acceleration of financial liberalization over the same time period. This process resulted in substantial changes in market structure, deriving both from greater foreign presence and from increased privatization across the region.
There is a general consensus in the literature on the benefits of financial liberalization, as it fosters competition and promotes economic growth (Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001; Claessens and Laeven, 2004) . Deregulation-induced competition, in turn, can translate into incentives for managers to improve efficiency (Leibenstein, 1966) . However, evidence on the role of prudential regulation on bank efficiency is inconclusive. Although prudential regulation is primarily designed to strengthen systemic stability and improve the functioning of banking markets, some argue that these regulatory policies can have adverse effects on financial intermediation. Economic theory suggests that prudential regulatory tools can impact on the effectiveness of financial intermediation in a number of ways. For instance, stringent capital requirements can reduce banks' borrowing costs because high capitalization can signal lower bankruptcy risk. On the other hand, the imposition The Impact of Deregulation and Re-regulation 101 of minimum capital requirements may impose additional costs on banks. In particular, if banks are required to raise equity capital at a price higher than the interest rate on deposits, an increase in capital requirements may discourage banks' willingness to screen borrowers and lend (Thakor, 1996; Gorton and Winton, 2000) . Recent years have seen an increasing interest in the academic literature in evaluating the impact of prudential regulation of banks on efficiency. The empirical results, however, are rather mixed. There is evidence indicating that the current regulatory and supervisory frameworks impede the efficient operation of banks (Chortareas, Girardone and Ventouri, 2012). As steps towards further regulatory reforms are taking place in many Asian economies, it is important for policy makers to ascertain whether the regulatory reforms implemented in the post 1997 crisis period successfully brought the Asian banking sector into a more competitive, efficient and stable state. An analysis of the Asian market is significant, given its unique and dynamic regional characteristics. The region comprises well-developed economies such as those in Japan and Hong Kong, along with transitional economies, such as those in China, India and South East Asia. In the aftermath of the Asian crisis, the process and pace of regulatory reforms in banking varied substantially from country to country. Such diversification provides us with an excellent laboratory within which to understand the impact of regulatory reforms on banks' managerial decisions and performance. In addition, the lessons from the resolution of the Asian crisis have a strong resonance today, when many economies are embarking on the restructuring of their banking sectors in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis.
Thus far, the established literature that attempts to identify the potential impact of regulatory progress on bank performance has typically focused on either the European market (e.g., Chortareas et al., 2012; Delis, Molyneux and Pasiouras, 2011) , or has been based on publicly listed banks (Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis, 2009; Haw et al., 2010) . There is a paucity of studies that address the Asian market. This lack of empirical evidence makes the analysis of the Asian market particularly important from the perspective of regulatory authorities. Moreover, the established literature studying the impact of regulatory environments on bank performance often focuses on either deregulatory policies or prudential regulations; hardly any literature addresses both aspects simultaneously, or distinguishes the independent impacts of each regulatory tool on bank performance.
Against this background, our study explores how the coexistence of liberalization and prudential regulation affected banks' cost
